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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did City officers Roper and Peterson subject Appellant 
to a pretext stop? 
2. Was adequate evidence presented at trial to support a 
finding by the jury that Appellant was in actual physical control 
of his vehicle? 
3. Was Appellant was denied his constitutional protection 
against being compelled to give evidence against himself when the 
officer requested he perform certain field sobriety tests before 
reading him the Miranda rights? 
4. Did adequate justifications exist to arrest Appellant for 
both offenses charged? 
5. Does Appellant have standing to challenge the accuracy 
and reliability of the intoxilyzer machine. 
6. Are the trial court's proceedings below void because the 
assistant city attorney who prosecuted Appellant allegedly failed 
to file an oath of office? 
7. Was it error for the trial court to allow Assistant City 
Attorney, Jeffery "R" Burbank, to prosecute Appellant when 
Appellant had filed lawsuits against him? 
8. Was there sufficient evidence admitted in the trial below 
to establish the corpus delicti of the crime of being in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
or other drug to a degree that rendered Appellant incapable of 
safely operating his vehicle? 
9. Has Appellant failed to meet his burden to show the trial 
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court committed errors in its factual findings? 
10. Was Appellant denied his Sixth Amendment right to a trial 
based on ineffectiveness of counsel? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with driving under the influence of 
alcohol and/or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, and having 
an open container in a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor. 
A jury trial was held in this matter on the 26th day of April, 
1989 in the First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, County of 
Cache, Logan Department, The Honorable Pamela Heffernan presiding. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. The 
court entered a judgment of the same on the 9th day of June, 1989. 
Appellant is appealing from that verdict and judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts, as set forth in his brief, is 
predominated with statements that were not presented at the trial 
held in this matter and find no support in the transcript. Few of 
Appellant's statements are accompanied by citations. Those fact 
statements that do have citations apparently refer to three 
separate documents listed by Appellant as "DLH,H "SH" and MTR." 
Appellant's statements that are accompanied by a citation to the 
trail transcript (TR) generally find no support in the citation but 
are antithetical to it. 
The vast majority of the statements Appellant offers as facts 
are actually nothing more than legal conclusions or argument. 
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Appellant decided to not testify in the trial below but is 
apparently attempting to do so through his brief. 
Appellee objects to and disagrees with Appellant's statement 
of the facts, finds them wholly without support and provides the 
following facts offered as evidence in the proceedings below: 
1. Appellee, City of Logan, called four witnesses, all of 
the city police department, to testify during their case-in-chief. 
2. Officer Roper testified that he and Officer Peterson were 
on patrol in the City on February 11 1989. At approximately 2:00 
am he observed two vehicles parked in the roadway just west of Main 
Street on 200 South Street. (All citations below refer to page 
numbers in the transcript of the trail held in this matter, p. 29-
30) 
3. Roper walked up to one of the two vehicles, a pickup 
truck, and made the following observations: Appellant, Don Dunbar, 
the single occupant of the vehicle, was sitting in the driver's 
position behind the steering wheel; the keys to the truck were in 
the ignition, the engine was running and Appellant's left foot was 
depressed on the clutch pedal; an open beer can was positioned on 
the seat to the right of Appellant; and an odor of an alcoholic 
beverage emitted from inside the vehicle. (p.32-33) Roper later 
observed that the aforementioned beer can was partly full of beer, 
(p.49-50) 
4. Roper asked Appellant to exit the vehicle. Appellant 
turned the ignition off and exited the vehicle. (p.33) 
5. Roper smelled an alcoholic beverage on Appellant's breath 
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and asked him if he had been drinking. Appellant responded that 
he had had "two mini-bottles." (p.34) Roper noted Appellant's 
face was extremely red and very flushed. (p. 43) 
6. Roper had Appellant preform several field sobriety tests, 
(p. 33-41) At the conclusion of the tests, Roper testified that 
based on his training and experience he was of the opinion that 
Appellant was "under the influence of an alcoholic beverage to the 
point where he was impaired and was not in a condition to safely 
operate a vehicle." At that time Roper placed Appellant under 
arrest, recited the "Miranda rights" to him and requested that he 
submit to a breath test. (p. 42-43, 45) 
7. Roper transported Appellant to the jail, advised him of 
the consequences of refusing to submit to a breath test and read 
admonitions to him from a DUI report form. (p.43-44, 64-67) 
8. Appellant refused to submit to a breath test. (p.44) 
9. Roper gave Appellant his Miranda rights again and asked 
him if he understood them. Appellant responded that he did and 
agreed to an interview. (p.45) 
10. During the interview, Appellant made several statements 
including: that he had been operating a vehicle (p.45-46); that he 
had been drinking, specifically "two mini-bottles and a mixed 
drink" (p.48); and when asked if he was "under the influence of an 
alcoholic beverage now" Appellant responded hesitantly and in 
slurred speech with the words "not significantly." (p.49) 
11. Appellee's second witness, Officer Peterson, testified 
that he also saw the two vehicles parked in the road right next to 
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each other, with a distance of three feet between each other, 
(p.70-71) 
12. Peterson observed Appellant sitting in the driver's 
position inside his truck when they arrived on the scene. (p.72) 
13. Peterson did not observe Appellant's performance of the 
field sobriety tests because he was talking with the driver of the 
other vehicle at the time Roper administered the tests, (p.72) 
14. Peterson testified that he concluded Appellant was under 
the influence of alcohol to a degree that he was unable to operate 
a motor vehicle safely because of the following observations: 
Appellant had "a strong odor of alcohol coming from him . . . his 
face was extremely flushed, his eyes were very red . . . his speech 
was deliberate, and running words together and continuing to repeat 
words." He also noticed that Appellant was having problems with 
his balance inside the jail. (p.73) 
15. Appellee's third witness, Officer Fillmore, testified 
that he impounded and conducted an inventory of Appellant's vehicle 
on the night in question. (p.80, 82) 
16. Fillmore testified that when he arrived at the scene he 
observed Appellant's vehicle parked in the travel portion of the 
roadway. Upon searching the vehicle he discovered several 
containers of alcohol in the passenger compartment of Appellant's 
vehicle incLuding an open beer can on the fount seat next to where 
the driver would sit. The can was three-forth full of beer, 
(p.80-82) 
17. Appellee's forth and final witness, Officer Ken Kramer, 
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Evidence Custodial, testified for purposes of chain of custody with 
respect to the several containers of alcohol, including the open 
beer can, that were admitted into evidence. (p. 83-84) After 
which, Appellee rested. 
18. Appellant did not testify himself but did call two 
witnesses for his defense. 
19. Appellant's first witness was Clyde Baugh. Baugh 
testified that he was the driver of the second vehicle the officers 
observed early in the morning of February 11, 1991. (p-89) 
20. Baugh testified he was driving his vehicle, a van, on 
Second South at 1:30 am when he saw Appellant's vehicle parked 
along the side of the road. Baugh stopped his vehicle apparently 
to engage in conversation with Appellant. (p.90) 
21. Baugh described the scene as follows: the two vehicles 
were parked on opposite sides of the road pointed in opposite 
directions; Baugh had his window down; Appellant had his door open 
(because the window would not open); Appellant was sitting sideways 
in the seat facing out the door; and the two were talking. (p.9 2-
93, 107-08) 
22. With respect to the vehicles' position on the roadway, 
Baugh admitted that "we were probably obstructing something ..." 
but indicated that passing cars were able to get by them. (p.97-
98, 101) 
23. Baugh indicated that during the ten to fifteen minutes 
while they were conversing he did not see Appellant drink any 
alcohol. (p.98, 104) 
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24. Baugh testified that his vehicle was running but did not 
recall that Appellant's vehicle was running. (p.95, 97, 106-07) 
25. Baugh further indicated that when the officers approached 
Appellant's vehicle Appellant exited his vehicle, shut his door and 
walked toward the officers. (p.104-106) 
26. Appellant's second and final witness, Tracy Dunbar, 
testified that she drank the contents of a mini-bottle that was 
found in Appellant's vehicle. (p.Ill) No more testimony or 
evidence was offered. 
27. The juiry returned a verdict of guilty of driving under 
the influence of alcohol and/or being in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a class B 
misdemeanor and having an open container in a vehicle, a class B 
misdemeanor — both counts Appellant was charged with — which 
verdict Appellant is appealing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is an appeal where the appellant has seemingly collected 
every possible argument to challenge a DUI conviction and bound the 
same in his brief. Several of his arguments have no application 
to this case whatsoever. Appellee has tried to sort out all of 
Appellant's arguments, group them appropriately and respond 
completely to them. 
The testimonial evidence admitted at trial by Appellee was 
largely uncontroverted. What little was controverted by 
Appellant's witnesses proved to be immaterial. There was ample 
competent evidence admitted at trial to support the jury verdict 
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under Appellee or Appellant's theory of the case. This is an 
appeal that could easily be resolved by reading the Statement of 
Fact, supra, alone but the following argument is provided. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
CITY OFFICERS ROPER AND PETERSON DID NOT SUBJECT 
APPELLANT TO A PRETEXT STOP. 
Appellant's argument here is nonsense and without merit. It 
is completely uncontroverted that City Officers Roper and Peterson 
did NOT stop Appellant — Appellant was already stopped. In fact 
Appellant's theory of the case is that, according to Mr. Baugh's 
testimony, when Appellant saw the officer approaching his parked 
vehicle he voluntary stepped out of and walked towards him. Under 
Appellee's theory Appellant did not step out of the already parked 
vehicle until asked. 
Even so the officers would have been justified in stopping 
Appellant had it been necessary, or logically possible, because 
they were blocking the street with their parked vehicles, a 
violation of the state and city traffic codes. 
II 
THERE WAS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING BY THE 
JURY THAT APPELLANT WAS IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF HIS 
VEHICLE. 
"It is unlawful and punishable . . . for any person to operate 
or be in actual physical control of a vehicle . . . if the person 
is under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the 
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle." U.C.A. Sec. 41-
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6-44(l)(a). 
Appellant suggests that when the Officers Roper and Peterson 
discovered him parked on the roadway in his vehicle early in the 
morning of February 11, 1989 he was not in actual physical control 
of his vehicLe. Appellant correctly provides the standard for 
finding actual physical control in his brief. "Actual physical 
control can be established vwhere the driver was seated in his 
vehicle on the traveled portion of the highway; or where the motor 
of the vehicLe was operating; or where the driver was attempting 
to steer the automobile while it was in motion; or where he was 
attempting to brake the vehicle to arrest its motion'" (Quoting 
State v. Bugger, 483 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1971). (Brief of 
Appellant p.30). 
More recently in Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P. 2d 651 (1982) 
the Utah Supreme Court indicated that "As a matter of public policy 
and statutory construction, we believe that the vactual physical 
control' language of Utah's implied consent statute should be read 
as intending to prevent intoxicated drivers from entering their 
vehicles except as passengers or passive occupants . . . ." The 
court went on to conclude that "where a motorist occupied the 
driver's position behind the steering wheel with possession of the 
ignition key and with the apparent ability to start and move the 
vehicle, we hold that there has been an adequate showing of xactual 
physical control' under our implied consent statute." Garcia, 645 
P.2d at 653. 
The Court further indicated in Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 
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778, 781 (Utah 1986), that even if a vehicle is "presently immobile 
because of mechanical trouble," which would include a collision or 
having run out of gas, the driver can still be found to be in 
actual physical control. 
Turning to the immediate case the evidence presented at trial 
clearly supports a finding that Appellant was in actual physical 
control of his vehicle while parked in the roadway of a city 
street. Two officers testified they saw him, the single occupant 
of his vehicle, sitting behind the wheel in the driver's position. 
The officer who approached Appellant further testified that he 
observed the keys to the truck in the ignition, could hear the 
engine running and saw Appellant's left foot depressed on the 
clutch pedal. When the officer asked Appellant to step out of the 
vehicle he observed Appellant turn the ignition of his vehicle off. 
Even Appellant's witness, Mr. Baugh, testified he saw Appellant 
sitting in the driver's seat of his vehicle parked on the side of 
the road. 
Based on these facts and Utah law provided as provided in the 
Code and as annunciated by the Utah Supreme Court there can be no 
question the jury was justified in finding Appellant in actual 
physical control of his vehicle. 
Ill 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 
AGAINST BEING COMPELLED TO GIVE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIMSELF 
WHEN THE OFFICER REQUESTED HE PERFORM CERTAIN FIELD 
SOBRIETY TESTS BEFORE READING HIM THE MIRANDA RIGHTS. 
Appellant intimates that he was "compelled to give evidence 
against himself" in violation of Article I Section 12 of the Utah 
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Constitution cind also the 5th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. His basis for this claim is founded in the fact that 
Officer Roper asked him to perform certain field sobriety tests 
without advising him of his Miranda rights. 
The above-mentioned constitutional provisions constitute a bar 
against compelling "communication" or "testimony" but the privilege 
does not extend to barring compulsion which makes the accused the 
source of "real" or "physical" evidence. The leading case in this 
area is Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 
1021 ( ) . In that case, Mr. Justice Holmes stated, "The 
prohibition of compelling a man in criminal court to being a 
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or 
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an 
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." 
This privilege against being compelled to give evidence 
against oneself only extends to the extraction of guilt from a 
persons own lips. As a result, the use of the witness' body or 
aspects of his body which do not communicate thoughts or ideas is 
not prescribed. Illustratively, Defendants may be compelled to 
walk, stand, gesture, give hand writing examples, repeat phrases 
for voice identification, submit to finger or footprinting, don 
particular items of clothing, etc. Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed. 908 (1966). 
Additionally, Miranda rights need only be given to an accused 
"if the setting is custodial or accusatory rather than 
investigatory." And "for purposes of determining whether a crime 
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has been committed, investigation and interview are critical and, 
under such circumstances, the warning is not required." Salt Lake 
v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983). 
Specifically to the subject matter of this dispute, the Utah 
Supreme Court indicates that where field sobriety tests are 
requested and taken in a public street, with no indica of arrest 
such as readied handcuffs, locked doors, or drawn guns and the 
length of performance of the tests is only minutes, the setting is 
non-custodial, even though investigation had focused on the 
accused. Salt Lake v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983). 
In the immediate case, these field sobriety tests were 
administered in the investigatory stage before an arrest of 
Appellant was made and before it was determined that the crime was 
committed. Appellant was not placed under arrest until after the 
completion of the field sobriety tests when the officers came to 
the conclusion that he was in fact intoxicated to the degree that 
rendered him incapable of safely operating his vehicle. Appellant 
was not compelled to testify against himself when Officer Roper 
requested he perform several short field sobriety tests. 
IV 
THERE WAS ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATIONS TO ARREST APPELLANT FOR 
BOTH OFFENSES CHARGED. 
"A peace officer may . . . without warrant, arrest a person 
. . . (1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the 
presence of any peace officer . . . ." U.C.A. Sec. 77-7-2. 
According to Officer Roper's testimony three offenses were 
committed in is presence. First, Appellant was parked in a roadway 
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in violation of U.C.A. Sec. 41-6-104, second, he had an open 
container of alcohol in his vehicle in violation of U.C.A. Sec. 41-
6-44.20 and third, Appellant was in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while intoxicated in violation of U.C.A. Sec. 41-6-44. 
Appellant was arrested for the later two. 
Apparently Appellant does not dispute the officer's 
justification to arrest him for the open container violation. He 
provided no evidence to refute the same during the trial below and 
provides no discussion concerning it in his brief. He does however 
challenge the fact that the officer had reasonable cause to believe 
Appellant was intoxicated. Officer Roper's testimony indicates he 
collected numerous data to support the fact that Appellant was 
intoxicated including the results of several field sobriety tests. 
Peterson also made several observations before coming to the 
conclusion Appellant was intoxicated. 
Appellant correctly states in his brief what indicators "are 
enough to lead a Reasonable and prudent person in the arresting 
officers position to be justified in believing . . . '" Appellant 
was intoxicated. (Quoting Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1037 
(Utah App. 1987). According to Appellant these indicators include 
"the smell of alcohol on defendant's breath; slurred speech; poor 
balance; drooling; various field sobriety tests." (Citations 
omitted.) (Appellant's Brief p.35.) 
Appellant represents "the only objective fact that Officer 
Roper relied on was an odor of alcohol." (Appellant's Brief p.35) 
However in stating this, Appellant clearly misrepresents Roper's 
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testimony and wholly overlooks Peterson's testimony. Roper 
testified (i) that he observed an odor of alcohol on Appellant's 
breath, (ii) that he observed his face was extremely red and very 
flushed and (iii) that Appellant failed the several field sobriety 
tests administered by him. Officer Peterson testified that (i) 
Appellant had a strong odor of alcohol coming from him, (ii) his 
face was extremely flushed, (iii) his eyes were very red, (iv) his 
speech was deliberate, (v) he ran his words together, (vi) he 
continually repeated words and (vii) he had trouble with his 
balance. 
The observations the officers testified they made before 
effecting an arrest met the standard annunciated by Appellant in 
his brief and went beyond. Clearly the officer's observed adequate 
indicia of intoxication to arrest Appellant for being in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated to a degree that 
rendered Appellant incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
V 
APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
ACCURACY AND RELIABILITY OF THE INTOXILYZER MACHINE, 
Appellant goes to great lengths to argue the inaccuracy and 
unreliability of the intoxilyzer machine in his brief. Appellant's 
argument is confusing and misplaced. Appellant refused to submit 
to a test to determine the level of his intoxication; consequently, 




THE TRIAL COURT'S PROCEEDINGS BELOW ARE NOT VOID BECAUSE 
THE ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY WHO PROSECUTED APPELLANT 
ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO FILE AN OATH OF OFFICE OR EXECUTE A 
BOND OF SUFFICIENT SURETIES. 
Appellant suggests the trial proceedings, where he was tried 
before a jury and convicted are completely void because he was 
prosecuted by Assistant City Attorney, Jeffery "R" Burbank, who 
had allegedly failed to file an oath of office required of all 
public officials. Appellant does not dispute Burbank is licenced 
to practice law in Utah, has taken an oath pursuant to membership 
in the state bar and an oath pursuant to being appointed Assistant 
Logan City Attorney. Appellant's claim is limited to the required 
filing only. 
Appellee maintains however, that Burbank, by the very nature 
of his subordinate, part-time position in the City Attorney's 
Office, is not required to file such an oath. But still, 
Appellant's suggestion to void an entire trial proceeding from the 
entry of the information against Appellant through the entry of 
judgment and beyond is clearly not an appropriate corrective 
measure. U.C.A. Section 10-3-829 provides "no official act of any 
municipal officer shall be invalid for the reason that he failed 
to take an oath of office." Further, such defect of filing by 
itself does not affect the Plaintiff's substantial rights. 
In the appendix of Appellant's brief he lists other government 
officials who have been acting as impostors because of the lack of 
filing the required oath. His enumeration includes, but is not 
limited to, Governor Norman H. Bangerter, Justice Gordon R. Hall 
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and all members of the Utah Senate and House of Representatives. 
Appellant apparently hopes this Court of Appeals will void all 
official acts taken by virtually every official in all three 
branches of state government due to similar deficiencies. 
Appellant's argument, if successful would void the law he was tried 
under, the officer who arrested him, the attorney who prosecuted 
him, the judge who tried him and the court who will hear this 
appeal. 
The problem with Appellant's claim is two fold: first, his 
claim is nothing more than mere assertions unaccompanied by proof 
or affidavits (Burbank's oath of office is on file in the office 
of the city recorder and was when he signed the amended information 
charging Appellant and also on file when he prosecuted Appellant 
for the crimes that are the subject of this appeal); second, 
Appellant is, if you will, killing the goose that could potentially 
lay his golden egg. For example, Appellant adamantly argues in his 
Statement of Jurisdiction the Utah Court of Appeals is "unofficial, 
unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void." Yet he files this 
appeal seeking this court to assume authority it is without to 
declare it without authority to do the very thing he seeks. 
Even if Appellant was correct with his assertion that the 
prosecutor, the courts and others' actions have been conducted 
without having properly filed an oath of office the remedy could 




IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW ASSISTANT 
CITY ATTORNEY, JEFFERY "R" BURBANK, TO PROSECUTE 
APPELLANT WHEN APPELLANT HAD FILED LAWSUITS AGAINST HIM. 
Appellant argues this point without support in authority or 
logic that it was error for the trial court to allow the Assistant 
City Attorney, Jeffery "RM Burbank, to prosecute Appellant when 
Appellant had lawsuits filed against the him. 
This argument is absurd on its face. Sheltering Appellant 
from being prosecuted by an attorney merely because Appellant has 
instigated civil action against the same could lead to a complete 
miscarriage of justice. Appellant could, through other well-
placed lawsuits, be able to insulate himself from prosecution for 
any crime. Appellant would effectively award himself a license to 
be lawless within any chosen jurisdiction, 
VIII 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ADMITTED IN THE TRIAL BELOW 
TO ESTABLISH THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME OF BEING IN 
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR OTHER DRUG TO A DEGREE THAT 
RENDERED APPELLANT INCAPABLE OF SAFELY OPERATING HIS 
VEHICLE. 
The standard for satisfying the requirement of corpus delicti 
requires "only that the state present evidence that the injury 
specified in the crime occurred, and that such injury was caused 
by someone's criminal conduct." State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175, 
176 (Utah 1977) . 
In the immediate case, Appellee met and went beyond this 
minimal corpus delicti requirement. Not only did Appellee put on 
evidence to show the crime of being in actual physical control of 
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the vehicle was committed, it put on evidence to show that the 
Appellant was the individual who committed the crime independent 
of any admissions by Appellant. In fact, two officers testified 
they saw Appellant sitting behind the wheel of his vehicle on a 
roadway and testified, based on their observations of Appellant, 
he was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him 
incapable of safely driving his vehicle. 
IX 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN TO SHOW THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED ERRORS IN ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
The Utah Supreme Court indicated in Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 
P. 2d 651, 653 (1982), that "the standard for appellate review of 
factual findings affords great difference to the trial court's view 
of the evidence unless a trial court has misapplied the law or its 
findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence." 
In this appeal, Appellant must show where the trial court 
"misapplied the law" or where its findings are "clearly against the 
weight of the evidence." Appellee maintains that the court's 
findings are not inconsistent with the law or evidence but rather 
completely consistent with competent evidence. A complete summary 
of the important evidence admitted at trial is included above in 
the statement of facts and argued herein with specificity. 
In the immediate case, the jury chose to believe the officers' 
testimony and found Appellant guilty of the offenses charged. The 
law in Utah is clear: "When there are divergent elements of 
competent before the jury, its findings based on its belief as to 
which preponderates will be respected on appeal..." Weber Basin 
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Water Conservancy District v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 
(1958). 
Appellant's most serious problem here is that he could have 
reasonably been found guilty regardless of whether the jury 
believed the prosecution or defendant's version of the facts. All 
material facts leading to a conviction remain uncontroverted. 
Appellant's second witness, Tracy Dunbar, offered no evidence 
relevant to the charged crimes and Appellant's first witness, Clyde 
Baugh, largely substantiated the testimony of Appellee's witnesses 
Officer Roper and Peterson. 
X 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A 
TRIAL BASED ON INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL. 
Appellant claims in a general and vague manner that his right 
to a fair trail was denied due to the alleged ineffectiveness of 
his counsel. The burden Appellant must met for such a claim to be 
effective is set forth by the United States Supreme Court in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984). In Strickland the Court stated "the benchmark for judging 
any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 
The Court set forth two specific components that must be met 
by Appellant to be successful in this claim: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
"counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the 
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deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable." 
id. The Court further indicated that aside from cases where an 
actual conflict of interest is shown the defendant must 
"affirmatively prove prejudice." id. 
Appellant has not shown his counsel's performance was 
deficient, that an actual conflict of interest existed or 
affirmatively proved prejudice resulted. Appellant provides 
nothing in the argument portion of his brief to support his claim, 
merely providing statements presented as "facts." 
The only supporting evidence Appellant provides in his brief 
relative to the issue of effectiveness of counsel is correspondence 
concerning a complaint Appellant filed with the Utah State Bar 
against his counsel, Gregory N. Skabelund included in his Appendix. 
The letters Appellant includes in his brief injure his claim of 
ineffectiveness of counsel because they suggest the contrary. The 
complaints filed by Appellant against Skabelund were dismissed. 
Because Appellant fails to provide support for his claim of 
ineffectiveness of counsel this argument of his must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing the conviction of Appellant should 
stand. 
DATED this 25th day of March, 1991. 
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